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ABSTRACT: Some time ago, Phyllis Deane pointed to “an inescapable tension between political 
economy and economic science”. Yet, the separation of positive economics (pure and empirical) on the one 
hand and normative economics (pure and applied) on the other is still common among neoclassical 
economists and has a long tradition. Moreover, Keynes "[wanted] to emphasize strongly the point about 
economics being a moral science", which implies that, in his view, the separation between science and 
ethics cannot be maintained either. In this paper we argue that an entirely different vision of society and 
of man is implied in the neoclassical approach and in the classical-Keynesian approach, which is 
associated with widely differing views on the great problems of economic theory: value, distribution, 
employment and money. The method employed in both approaches is also fundamentally different; this 
shows up in a differing relationship between theory and historical reality. Finally, the relationship 
between economics on the one hand and ethics and politics on the other is sharply opposed to the liberal 
and to the middle-way classical-Keynesian view. It is argued that in neoclassical economics a tension 
exists between economic science and political economy, between theory and history and between 
economics on the one hand and ethics and politics, and that such a tension does not exist in classical-
Keynesian political economy. The clue to this state of affairs is provided by the differing visions of society 




'Political Economy and Economic Science' is a major theme in Phyllis Deane's later 
work. Her Evolution of Economic Ideas (Deane 1978) puts some of the current 
theoretical controversies into long-term perspective by tracing their historical 
antecedents (Deane 1978) and, as such, pictures how economics as a science has 
evolved. However, The State and the Economic System  (Deane 1989)  is conceived as 
an introduction to the history of political economy, i.e. “the development of economic 
knowledge over the past three hundred years with particular reference to the ways in 
which the broader contexts of moral, scientific, and political ideas or events have 
influenced successive economists' vision of the operations of the changing economic 
system and their views of the scope for purposive State action to shape the process of 
change” (p. vi).  
         Some  time  ago,  Phyllis  Deane pointed to "an inescapable tension between 
political economy and economic science - a tension which could not, in practice, be 
bypassed by detaching positive economics from moral and ethical considerations, or 
pure-theoretic from applied economics" (Deane 1991, p. 175). Yet, the separation of 
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positive economics (pure and empirical) on the one hand and normative economics 
(pure and applied) on the other is still common among neoclassical economists and 
has a long tradition: "Neville Keynes, with the advice and encouragement of his 
teacher Marshall, set out the taxonomic ground rules that should enable the academic 
student of economics to distinguish assumptions and findings about what is 
(constituting the positive core of economic science) from, on the one hand, statements 
about what ought to be (the scientific justification of which belongs to the moral 
sciences) and, on the other hand, prescriptions for achieving desired ends (i.e. the art 
of political economy)" (Deane 1991, p. 174). Subsequently, the neoclassical position - 
economics as a science, independent from ethics - was formulated most clearly in 
Lionel Robbins' Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1935).  
         The separation between economic science and the art of political economy leaves 
an inevitable uneasiness, as the "object of any economic scientist's research is 
ultimately (if not always proximately) the solution of certain practical policy problems 
[...]. Marshall himself envisaged the cumulative results of systematic economic 
research as being useful and accessible to practical men of business as well as 
legislators. [...] However, being more sensitive than most Marshallians to the tension 
between the pure science of economics (of which he was an acknowledged master) and 
the art of political economy (which he wished to serve), he made it his rule 'to avoid 
taking part in the discussion of a burning political question even if it contains a large 
economic element' " (Deane 1991, p. 175). Marshall's extreme reluctance to take a 
position in the 'free trade versus protection' issue is an example (Deane, 1991, pp. 
175-177).  
         There  is,  however, an alternative strand of economic thought which does not 
separate economic science from political economy in the sense proposed by Marshall: 
"The founders of political economy [the Physiocrats, the English classical economists, 
and Karl Marx] had started with the confident presumption [...] that the system 
within which individual producers cooperate to earn their livelihood was governed by 
laws that operated as independently of human volition as the laws which natural 
scientists found applicable to the physical universe. They took it for granted [...] that 
political economy was a science" (Deane 1991, p. 173), not an art as is the case since 
the (marginalist) neoclassical revolution in the 1870s. And equally important, the 
classical economists, above all Ricardo, did not hesitate to give strong policy advice on 
the basis of their 'Principles of Political Economy'. Ricardo's position with respect to 
free trade and the Corn Laws is well known. In this century, "John Maynard Keynes 
had no inhibitions about mixing politics with economics. [His] principal contribution 
to the art of political economy was to bring into sharp focus what is still its basic 
problem, i.e. identifying the scope for governmental intervention. [However,] it was 
Keynes' contributions to economic science (rather than to political economy) that 
enabled him to achieve his personal ambition of revolutionizing 'the way the world 
thinks about economic problems'" (Deane 1991, p. 177). Thus, there is no gulf at all 
between economic science and political economy with Ricardo and Keynes. Moreover, 
Keynes "[wanted] to emphasize strongly the point about economics being a moral 
science" (Keynes 1973b, p. 300), which implies that, in his view, the separation 
between science and ethics cannot be maintained either. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM AND SOME DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
 
The above suggests that there are two broad strands of economic thought implying a 
very different relationship between economic science, made up of pure theory or 
principles, and political economy, i.e. applied theory in a wider sense, comprising 
policy prescriptions and links with other domains, e.g. the political sphere, history 
and ethics. For the classical and Keynesian economists, there seems to be no tension 
between economic science and political economy; rather, as will be seen later, both THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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concepts are presumably strongly complementary; for example, Ricardo wrote on 'the 
principles of political economy'.1 However, a yawning gap between economic science 
and political economy exists in neoclassical theory in the broadest sense of the term, 
i.e. Walrasian general equilibrium theory, Marshallian partial equilibrium theory and 
Austrian 'disequilibrium theory', and its various refinements, particularly the 
'rational expectations' theory. Why is this so? This is the problem to be dealt with in 
these notes. 
         The first issue to be tackled relates to the approach underlying classical and 
Keynesian economic theory on the one hand and neoclassical theory on the other. 
What are the answers given to the great questions of economic theory: value, 
distribution, employment, the role of money and international trade (sections III and 
IV)? The ensuing sections deal with those implications of the classical and Keynesian 
and of the neoclassical frameworks of analysis which, in our view, are most relevant 
to the relationship between economic science and political economy. In section V, the 
visions of man and society underlying the two strands of thought are sketched. 
Section VI tackles a problem of method: the perception of the relationship between 
theory and historical reality by the classical and Keynesian political economists on 
the one hand, and by the neoclassical economists on the other is crucial for the 
relationship between economic science and political economy. A different role played 
by ethics and politics is also implied in both strands of thought (section VII). In the 
concluding section (VIII) the lines of thought developed in the previous sections are 
gathered together in order to attempt an assessment of the relationship between 
political economy and economic science. 
         The main definitional issues arising in this essay relate to the close association 
existing between classical (essentially Ricardian) and Marxian political economy on 
the one hand and post Keynesian political economy on the other. Both strands of 
thought overlap because the latter comprises the neo-Ricardians (Sraffa and his 
followers) and the Keynesians (in the widest sense of the term), including Keynesian 
Fundamentalists, e.g. Paul Davidson, Robinsonians or Kaleckians, e.g. G.C. Harcourt 
and J.A. Kregel; and New Keynesians (on this specific definitional problem see 
Harcourt 1981, Hamouda and Harcourt 1988, and Harcourt 2001). The picture is 
further complicated by the fact that there are Keynesians dealing with long-period 
aspects of output and employment (Garegnani 1978/79 and 1983; Bortis 1997); since 
long-period levels of output and employment are governed by technology and 
institutions (Bortis 1997) one could speak appropriately of 'Keynesian 
institutionalists'; the synthesis of neo-Ricardian and Keynesian institutionalist long-
period, together with short-period Keynesian fundamentalist theory and with 
medium-term Kaleckian theory form a comprehensive system of classical-Keynesian 
political economy (set forth in Bortis 1997).  
          Considerable  differences  exist between Ricardians and Keynesians. However, 
these differences are not unsuperable and allow for a broad synthesis (Bortis 1997). 
The neo-Ricardians (as well as Ricardo and Marx) essentially deal with the principles 
regulating the functioning of socioeconomic systems (the social process of production 
and the institutions associated with the distribution and the use of the surplus). Thus, 
in terms of theory, the neo-Ricardians consider the principles - the causal forces - 
governing fully adjusted situations, i.e. those parts of socioeconomic reality which are 
governed by persistent and slowly changing institutional factors and by the 
production system: the normal prices or the prices of production in the sense of Sraffa 
(1960), implying that the profit and interest rates are governed by socioeconomic 
forces (e.g. entrepreneurial associations, trade unions and central banks). The 
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Keynesian institutionalists deal, as suggested above, with the normal quantities that 
emerge from an interdependent production system and the long-period, normal or 
'trend' level of output and employment are determined by long-period effective 
demand which, in turn, depends, as will be suggested below, on the various 
institutions making up the socioeconomic and political system (Bortis 1997, pp. 142-
154). It is important to note that 'trend' or long-period output and employment do not 
imply full employment and are not equivalent to the corresponding statistical trends. 
The former are governed at any moment of time by the institutional set-up prevailing 
at the same moment and would coincide with the statistical trends only in stationary 
conditions.  
         The fully adjusted situation, which includes trend output and employment, thus 
represents a kind of 'equilibrium', that would be realized had the entrepreneurs taken 
the correct accumulation decisions in the past. This is impossible which is equivalent 
to saying that economies can never be in equilibrium. The fully adjusted situation is, 
therefore, a hidden part of the real world governed by the the persistent or slowly 
changing institutional forces - the socioeconomic system - which is superseded by the 
visible socioeconomic outcomes (capital stocks, output and employment levels, market 
prices) resulting from aggregate behaviour of individuals. The presently existing 
institutional system, including the production system, is the result of past behaviour. 
Hence, the fully adjusted situation is not a 'gravitation centre' since aggregate 
behaviour and the institutional system are not independent from each other: the 
former constantly modifies parts of the latter, i.e. there is technological and 
institutional change (see also Roncaglia 1995). As a rule, actual magnitudes will not 
converge towards normal ones: for example, actual output may fluctuate more or less 
regularly around normal output. Nevertheless, normal output is important as it 
governs normal employment and thereby persistent long-period unemployment levels 
(Bortis 1997, pp. 81-89). 
         Hence for the classicals and the Keynesian institutionalists the functioning of 
the system as a whole is primary and the behaviour of the individuals acting within 
the system (institutions) is secondary; moreover, behaviour is largely determined by 
the system. For instance, the real capital stock - the result of past accumulation - 
embodying certain techniques of production requires the deliveries of certain goods 
between industries if the social process of production is to go on in an orderly way; 
this cannot be changed at once because the size and the composition of the real capital 
stock can be modified only gradually through gross investments; or, trend effective 
demand governs the volumes of trend output and employment and of trend 
investment; this exerts a determining influence on all workers and investors: only a 
certain number of workers will find a workplace and only a given number of 
investment projects will succeed in the long run. 
         The determinism exerted by the system does not imply that there is no scope for 
freedom for the behaviour of individuals: there are considerable possibilities of choice 
regarding means and aims within a given institutional framework, above all 
regarding consumption and leisure activities. Moreover, the outcomes associated with 
aggregate behaviour will always deviate from the outcomes of the system (an economy 
is never in 'equilibrium'). Furthermore, uncertainty is not excluded either: given the 
volumes  of trend employment and trend investment it is highly uncertain who will be 
employed or unemployed and which investment projects will succeed in the long run. 
         The  Keynesians,  however,  deal with these directly observable disequilibrum 
situations resulting from aggregate behaviour and with the uncertainty attached to 
individual investment projects. The Robinsonians (or Kaleckians) have worked out a 
theory of cyclical growth based upon the double-sided relationship between profits and 
investment. The Keynesian Fundamentalists mainly deal with degrees of capacity 
utilization in relation with short-period effective demand and with the role of money 
in an uncertain world. Clear-cut divisions between the different Keynesian groups do THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
P.G. Michaelides, National Technical University of Athens © 2010                                  Kindly hosted on-line: http://users.ntua.gr/jea  
53   
not exist. However, what distinguishes them from the neo-Ricardians and the 
Keynesian institutionalists is that they consider behavioural outcomes that are co-
ordinated by the system; in fact, the system sets restrictions to the scope of behaviour 
through the volume of effective demand which is associated with the monetary flows 
taking place within the production system. This means that the social process of 
production is always implied in Keynesian analysis; with some Keynesian authors, 
e.g. Donald Harris, the sphere of production even figures prominently. 
         We  denote  the  synthesis  of  classical  and  Keynesian  elements  of  analysis  as 
classical-Keynesian political economy (Bortis 1997) which, in fact, constitutes a 
synthesis and an elaboration of post Keynesian political economy. In the subsequent 
lines classical-Keynesian political economy is contrasted with liberal or neoclassical 
economic theory. 
         The neoclassical economists concentrate upon the behaviour of individuals and 
postulate that the economic actions of individuals are co-ordinated by an anonymous 
self-regulating mechanism, i.e. the market mechanism, which, if functioning 
satisfactorily, is supposed to solve the great economic problems, that is value, 
functional distribution and employment. In what follows, we shall concentrate on 
fundamentals (principles) only which are associated with the classical-Keynesian and 
with the neoclassical approach respectively. 
 
III. PRODUCTION BASED THEORIES AND THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
In recent years, the habit to broadly classify economic theories according to the 
importance they attach to production and exchange has become increasingly 
attractive. This classification has been proposed by Luigi Pasinetti (for example in 
Pasinetti 1981, pp. 8ff and pp. 23ff and in Pasinetti 1986) and extensively put to use 
in an important volume on the foundations of economic theory (Baranzini and 
Scazzieri 1986). Classical-Keynesian political economy is production based. This is 
evident for classical (Ricardian-Sraffian) political economy; work along Keynesian 
lines implies production: in fact, Keynes explicitly aimed at developing a monetary 
theory of production (Keynes 1973b, pp. 408-11). Classical-Keynesian political 
economists conceive of production as a social  process: a common aim, the production 
of the social product, is reached by combining complementary means, i.e. sectors of 
production and firms cooperate to produce goods. However, neoclassical economic 
theory is built upon exchange, and production is an application of exchange. The 
neoclassical view of production is individualistic: entrepreneurs combine factors of 
production to produce at minimum costs; more expensive factors are substituted for 
cheaper ones if 'factor prices' change. Some implications of these different views on 
production will be brought out in the subsequent sections. 
         Production plays a basic role in classical political economy. Marx denoted the 
social process of production most felicitously as an interaction between man (labour) 
and nature (land). With his labour theory of value Ricardo brought out systematically 
for the first time the labour aspect of the social process of production. This aspect of 
production was taken up in Marx's Kapital, the first volume of which is called Der 
Produktionsprozess des Kapitals and in Pasinetti's vertically integrated labour model 
(Pasinetti 1981, 1993). Production as a social phenomenon, i.e. as an interrelated 
circular process, is also central in Quesnay's tableau économique where the nature 
aspect of production is put to the fore. Leontief's input-output models, Sraffa's prices 
of production model and Pasinetti's Lectures on the Theory of Production (Pasinetti 
1977) all grew out of Quesnay's horizontal and interindustry framework. Keynes, 
when working out his General Theory, explicitely aimed at elaborating a model of a 
monetary production economy: money (finance) enables production and the result of 
social production is 'exchanged' against money; at this stage the principle of effective THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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demand enters the picture. Indeed, Pasinetti considers his vertically integrated 
production framework (which implies  interindustry relations - Pasinetti, 1981, 
pp.109ff) as an analytical basis for Keynesian type of work: "[...] it is possible to build 
a unifying theory behind all the new [non-marginalist] contributions to economics [...]" 
(Pasinetti, 1981, p. 19): "(i) Keynes/Kalecki's short-run theory of unemployment; (ii) 
the discussion on the behaviour of firms [..] which led to the formulation of the full 
cost principle and to the studies of oligopolistic behaviour; and [...] to 'managerial 
economics' theories; (iii) Leontief's input-output analysis and Sraffa's production of 
commodities scheme; (iv) [Keynesian and post Keynesian] theories of the business 
cycle; (v) Harrod-Domar's macro-dynamic model and the post-Keynesian theories of 
growth and distribution" (Pasinetti 1981, p. 17). 
                  One of the purposes of this note is to suggest that within production based 
economic theories there is no tension between political economy and economic science. 
This requires a brief look at the kind of economic theory that emerges from a 
production based approach; we consider the theory of value and distribution, of 
employment, of money and of international trade. 
         With the social process of production as the analytical starting point, relative 
normal prices depend, in principle, upon the conditions of production and  o n  
distribution. With n-1 goods (the n-th good being labour), there are "n-1 production 
equations in n+1 unknowns, namely [the money wage rate, the rate of profits] and [...] 
n-1 prices [...]. We therefore have two more unknowns than we have equations [...]; we 
may begin by setting the price of any arbitrarily chosen commodity equal to unity. 
The number of prices (which thereby become relative prices) is reduced to (n-2) and 
the total number of unknowns is reduced to n. We have still one degree of freedom 
[...]; since it would have no economic meaning to fix arbitrarily a relative price, we are 
left with a choice between the [real] wage rate and the rate of profit" (Pasinetti 1977, 
p. 73). Various solutions have been proposed to solve this problem. The classical 
economists, particularly Ricardo, have opted for determining the wage rate: the 
natural wage is a physiological and sociological datum which may, however, vary in 
time and in space (see, for example, Dobb 1973, pp. 91-92); rent is determined by the 
marginal principle and profits appear as a surplus remaining after payments of 
wages: the surplus principle of distribution is of a sociological nature in that it 
embodies part-whole relationships, represented here by the wages and profits share in 
income net of rents. Modern post Keynesians opt for determining the profit rate 
through the Cambridge equation - the realized profit rate is determined in the sphere 
of exchange. For the Classical-Keynesians distribution is related to the social process 
of production: processes of collective and individual wage bargaining shape the wage 
structure, the calculation of normal prices is based upon the normal costs of 
production takes account of a target rate profits; customs and habits will substantially 
affect distributional outcomes and the state may intervene in fixing minimum wages. 
In the medium term, i.e. in the course of the business cycle, the double sided 
relationship investment-profits relationship (Joan Robinson and Michal Kalecki) will 
be associated with deviations of realised prizes and profits from long-period (normal) 
prices and profit levels. 
         In production based theories of value and distribution, distribution inevitably 
appears as a social and political problem. John Stuart Mill most clearly perceived 
this: "The laws and conditions of production of wealth partake of the character of 
physical truths. There is nothing optional and arbitrary about them. [...] It is not so 
with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution only [...]. The 
distribution of wealth [...] depends on the laws and customs of society. The rules by 
which it is determined, are what the opinions and feeling of the ruling portion of the 
community make them, and are very different in different ages and countries; and 
might still be more different, if mankind so chose" (John Stuart Mill 1909, pp. 
199/200). This may perhaps be considered as the most appropriate formulation not THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
P.G. Michaelides, National Technical University of Athens © 2010                                  Kindly hosted on-line: http://users.ntua.gr/jea  
55   
only of the classical, but also of the modern post Keynesian and classical-Keynesian 
approach to distribution. 
         This approach to distribution leaves the gate wide open for 'political economy' to 
enter: distribution is, fundamentally, not a market problem - although the intensity of 
competition may play a role in governing profit rates - but mainly a social, i.e. a 
sociological and political issue. The social character of distribution emerges most 
forcefully in part-whole relationships between individuals and groups on the one hand 
and society as a whole on the other. Such part-whole relationships are implicit in 
income structures and in shares in a given national income governed by effective 
demand. Consequently, to take an example, the wage rate is not the price of labour 
which equilibrates supply and demand on the labour market, but is a share in a given 
overall income. Finally, in a production based approach, distribution - the real wage 
rate or the rate of profits - must be known to determine relative prices (of production); 
distribution is logically prior to value (Sraffa 1960). Indeed, in practical life, price 
calculation can take place only if a wage structure and a target rate of profit are 
already there. This is perhaps why, in Ricardo's view, "[to] determine the laws which 
regulate [...] distribution is the principal problem in Political Economy" (Ricardo 1821, 
p. 5). The importance of distribution is enhanced by the fact that it is crucial in 
governing the scale of economic activity and hence of the level of employment through 
the purchasing of the population, a point emphasised by Keynes several times in his 
General Theory (e.g. p. 373). 
         In a monetary production economy the employment problem arises from the very 
nature of the social process of production. In all models picturing this process (models 
of the Leontief-Sraffa-Pasinetti type), only relative proportions  are determined, 
leaving the scale of activity undetermined: "[...] the systems of [price and quantity] 
equations [...] yield solutions for relative prices and relative  quantities, which are 
independent of the total quantity of labour available" (Pasinetti 1981, p. 23, 30). The 
determination of the proportions between industries and sectors governing relative 
prices and quantities is the principal problem of classical macroeconomics, whilst 
Keynesian macroeconomics is about the scale of economic activity, with structures as 
given. 
         It is at this stage, that Kalecki's and Keynes's employment theory based upon 
the principle of effective demand enters the picture. To complement the classical - 
long-period - production model embodying constant or slowly changing elements of 
socioeconomic reality, a long-period theory of effective demand is required. Such a 
theory might be based upon a supermultiplier relation (suggested in Hicks, 1950): the 
autonomous (exogenous) demand components - government expenditures and exports 
- are linked through a supermultiplier to the endogenous variables, i.e. output and 
employment (Bortis 1997, pp. 142-204). The size of the supermultiplier, governing 
output and employment in principle, depends, most importantly, upon distribution: a 
larger mark-up on wages and thus a higher profit rate and a higher share of profits 
are associated with a lower supermultiplier. The foreign trade position is also 
relevant: a smaller import coefficient relative relative to the export volume and more 
favourable terms of trade imply a higher supermultiplier. The trend (gross) 
investment ratio (the trend growth rate of autonomous expenditures), the 
depreciation coefficient and the capital-output ratio are all positively linked with the 
size of the supermultiplier. 
         Two  important  features  characterize the supermultiplier relation. First, the 
trend rate of growth of exports is decisive for the long-term evolution of capitalist 
economies (this is in line with the Harrod-Kaldor theory of the export multiplier: 
Kaldor 1989, pp. 90-99; Bortis 1997, pp. 190-98). Second, trend output and 
employment move together with the share of wages in national income; this 
conclusion is standard in post Keynesian and classical-Keynesian models and is due 
to the fact that the fraction of wage incomes consumed is much larger than that of THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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property income: in the long run, consumption expenditure is crucial, and the level of 
investment has to be in line with the capacities required to produce the normal - long-
period output; this means that only the capacity effect of investment is relevant in the 
long run (Bortis 1997, pp. 144 and 153). 
         The  independent  variables  of  the  supermultiplier  relation  (the  autonomous 
variables and the parameters determining the size of the supermultiplier) are all 
governed by institutions: for example, long-period (trend) government expenditures 
(regulated by legal prescriptions) are the outcome of a very complex process involving 
political institutions (the parliament, the government and the civil service) and 
socioeconomic institutions (e.g. various pressure groups); trend exports depend, 
among many other factors, upon the quality of the education system, the technical 
dynamism of an economy, labour relations, aggressiveness on world markets, and 
marketing and after-sale service; distribution (the wage structure and target profit 
rates) is, as has been suggested above, governed by customs and habits that have 
evolved historically and by present social relations between workers and employers.  
         Thus, the problem of employment determination is not simply a 'macroeconomic' 
problem because effective demand determines the level of output and employment. 
The effective demand mechanism pictured by the supermultiplier relation is but a 
vehicle which channels the influence of the whole socioeconomic system  (the material 
basis and the institutional superstructure) upon the level of long-period economic 
activity. Given this, the problem of employment determination is, essentially, a 
problem of political economy linked with the functioning of the socioeconomic and 
political system as a whole. 
         In  a  monetary  production  economy  money  is entirely integrated in the 
socioeconomic system. Production, consumption and investment plans are in terms of 
money which constitutes a link between the past and the future (Keynes). Banks 
provide finance to entrepreneurs so as to enable them to set the production process 
into motion, i.e. to buy means of production - labour force, raw materials; buildings 
and equipments are financed by the capital market and by own financial means. 
Within the social process of production - captured by Leontiev-Sraffa interindustry 
models and by Ricardo-Pasinetti vertically integrated models - the means of 
production are transformed into final products which are 'exchanged' against money 
which represents effective demand. The sales receipts obtained by the productive 
sector covers costs and allows to realise a profit. The central bank plays a key role in 
fixing the interest rate at which liquidity is provided (nowadays the international 
situation heavily influences the decisions taken by individual central banks). The 
interest level may, in turn, contribute to governing the rate of profits entering the 
price calculation of entreprises and influence thereby income distribution which, in 
turn, is an important factor determining the normal employment level through the 
supermultiplier mechanism (Bortis 1997, pp. 142-154 and 158-175).  
         In addition, wages and prices are fixed in money terms, determining thus the 
real wage rate. In a monetary production economy the real wage is a macroeconomic 
concept (Pasinetti 1993, pp.125ff); among other things this means that each worker's 
contribution to the common (social) product is paid for in paper money; with prices of 
production given, each worker may buy some of the final products which emerge from 
the production sector. Bank notes thus represent promises to acquire goods out of the 
social product in line with individual preferences. This in turn implies that, in a 
monetary production economy, the level of activity is always governed by effective 
demand in that final commodities have to be 'exchanged' against money. Finally, in 
such an economy, part of wealth is held in the form of money or near money, due to 
permanent uncertainty, whereby uncertainty is not related to the institutional system 
but to the situation of each individual. Hence near-certainty and uncertainty coexist. 
Effective demand governs the volumes of normal output, employment and investment THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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with near-certainty, while the fate of the individual workers and of the individual 
investment may be highly uncertain. 
         The theory of international trade emerging from a production based approach 
emphasizes quantity adjustments rather than price adjustments in bringing about 
tendencies towards current account equilibria. This implies putting to the fore the 
mercantilist-Keynesian employment aspect of international trade (Bortis 1997, pp. 
185-198). Indeed, according to the - Harrod-Kaldor - theory of the export multiplier 
long-period or trend output and employment crucially depend upon the volume and 
the growth of exports and on the export multiplier  which is the reciprocal of the 
import coefficient multiplied by the terms of trade (Bortis 1997, p. 191). The 
employment effect of international trade is particularly strong if exports mainly 
consist of advanced and research-intensive manufactured products and if imports are 
made up, in the main, of standard manufactures, agricultural products and raw 
materials; a low import coefficient (relative to exports) and favourable terms of trade 
are also conducive to a high employment level. A small import coefficient results from 
a low technical and cultural outside dependence and large market shares of domestic 
industries on home markets. The terms of trade represent a kind of 'international 
reduction coefficient': favourable terms of trade imply that the export produce, 
containing some given amount of domestic labour, buys relatively large quantities of 
foreign goods, containing an equally large amount of foreign labour. Such trade 
relations may come into being between highly developed countries producing 
sophisticated industrial goods and economically underdevelopped countries which 
produce standard products. 
         Some  important  corollaries  are  implied  in  the  export  multiplier  theory:  a 
particular division of labour on a world scale favours economic development in some 
countries while being a hindrance to development in other countries. Given world 
effective demand, one country may increase its level of economic activity at the cost of 
others through conquering higher market shares for industrial product and services. 
As Maynard Keynes perceived, a new world economic and financial order would be 
required to enable individual countries to achieve high employment levels; Keynes's 
propositions, based upon the conception of the bancor, would have to play an essential 
role in this reform (Keynes 1980). Once again, politics directly influences the economic 
domain. Politics also comes in directly regarding normative trade theory: in a 
monetary production economy with labour as the sole factor of production learning 
processes are far more important in enhancing economic development than trade 
(Pasinetti 1993, pp. 148ff). This implies that actually given prices and possibilities of 
trade that might be beneficial to the consumer in the short run (for example, most 
industrial goods are cheaper if imported) are not very important. What is important in 
the long run is to enhance the powers of production, i.e. to raise labour productivity. 
List's 'infant industry argument' is still of paramount importance today. In this 
context, international politics becomes immediately relevant as is forcefully argued by 
Kuttner in his important book The End of Laissez-Faire - National purpose and the 
global economy after the cold war (Kuttner 1991).  
         At  this  stage  it  should  be  reminded that Classical-Keynesians do not merely 
confine their attention to the functioning of the socioeconomic system and its 
determining influence upon the behaviour of individuals. The Keynesians and post 
Keynesians direct, as has been alluded to in section II above, their attention to 
behavioural outcomes. For example, the process of cyclical growth (Kalecki 1970) 
based upon the two-sided relationship between profit and growth rates (Robinson 
1962) reflects the aggregate accumulation behaviour of entrepreneurs and is 
associated with directly observable stocks of real capital and of output flows. Or, the 
holding of money for speculative purposes is based upon the uncertainty about the 
future which individuals face. However, there is an interaction between the 
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outcomes analysed by the classical-Keynesians: the actually existing system is the 
result of past behaviour. For example, past (gross) investment behaviour of 
entrepreneurs results in a certain present physical capital stock, which is, in turn, 
continuously modified by new gross investment. The technique of production 
embodied in this capital stock is an important part of the system: normal prices, 
depending upon the conditions of production and upon the target rate of profits, and 
normal prices and quantities make up the fully adjusted situation which is hidden 
below actual output (Bortis 1997, pp. 81-89). 
 
IV. EXCHANGE BASED THEORIES AND AGGREGATE INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
In neoclassical economic theory the starting point is clearly exchange. Schumpeter, in 
his  History of Economic Analysis, is illuminating on this: "The first problem that 
Jevons, Menger, and Walras [...] tackled by means of the marginal utility apparatus 
was the problem of barter. [...] they all [...] aimed at the same goal, which was to prove 
that the principle of marginal utility suffices to deduce the exchange ratios between 
commodities that will establish themselves in competitive markets [...]. The essential 
point is that [...] marginal utility analysis created an analytic tool of general 
applicability to economic problems. [Indeed,] Menger went on to say that means of 
production [...] come within the concept of economic goods by virtue of the fact that 
they also yield consumers' satisfaction, though only indirectly, through helping to 
produce things that do satisfy consumers' wants directly [...]. This analytic device [...] 
enables us to treat such things as iron or cement or fertilizers [...] as incomplete 
consumable goods, and thereby extends the range of the principle of marginal utility 
over the whole area of production and 'distribution' [...,] which really ceases to be a 
distinct topic [...]. The whole organon of pure economics thus finds itself unified in the 
light of a single principle - in a sense it never had before. [...] most of the problems 
that arise from this set-up can be discussed only on a level on which Walras rules 
supreme" (Schumpeter 1954, pp. 911-913). Indeed, Walrasian equilibrium economics 
is basic to the entire subsequent development of neoclassical economic theory.  
         The  structure  of  Walras’s  (1900)  Eléments clearly reveals the primacy of 
exchange over production: sections II and III deal exclusively with exchange; 
individuals are endowed with certain quantities of goods, and tastes are given; the 
process of exchange between individuals is governed by the principle of utility 
maximization; exchange results in a new allocation of goods which is a social optimum 
in the sense that it is not possible to increase the well-being of one or several 
individuals without diminishing the well-being of others. Subsequently  production is 
introduced   (Walras 1900, section IV, pp. 175ff): given quantities of factors of 
production (productive services) are allocated in the various production sectors, the 
process of allocation being governed by the principle of profit maximization, with the 
concepts of 'marginal productivity' and of 'factors markets' being implied in the 
analysis. Production thus emerges as a simple application of exchange.  In section V 
capital accumulation is brought in; again, equilibrium on the market for new capital 
goods is brought about by exchange (courbes d'achat et de vente des capitaux neufs; 
Walras 1900, pp. 289-290). Money appears at the last stage only (Walras 1900) to 
govern the absolute level of prices and to facilitate exchange of consumer goods and 
factor services. The real sector is all important and money plays a subordinate role.2  
                                                 
2 All this, of course, holds for Walras's Eléments only which became the foundation of neoclassical 
economic theory; from other works, e.g. his Etudes d'économie sociale, Walras emerges as a political 
economist as the following passage illustrates: "[...] in the spirit of John Stuart Mill, who regarded the 
'Distribution of wealth' as 'a matter of human institution solely' [...] Walras sought of Distribution as a 
socio-ethical problem and not one for which a solution could be ground out simply by turning the crank of 
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         According  to  neoclassical  economic  theory  the  price  mechanism  (supply  and 
demand) solves, in principle, all the great economic problems: in the first place, of 
course, the problem of value; functional income distribution becomes a simple 
appendix to price theory; the employment problem does not exist as equilibrium 
implies full employment - all markets clear at the equilibrium price vector; finally, 
money does not play an essential role in what is, fundamentally, a barter economy: 
money is a veil. Microeconomics is  economics; macroeconomics simply deals with 
aggregate individual behaviour and is, as such, qualitatively equivalent to 
microeconomics. The individualistic exchange approach to economic problems has 
consequences for the relationship between economic theory and political economy. 
According to neoclassical theory individuals act in different domains: economic, social, 
political, legal and moral. Each domain is governed by specific laws which co-ordinate 
the behaviour of individuals: e.g. the market mechanism in the economic sphere, and 
voting procedures, the tactics and strategies of political parties in the political sphere. 
Each sphere is largely autonomous. Therefore, politics should, in principle, not 
interfere with economics (the market mechanism) as a competitive (Walrasian) 
equilibrium is associated with a social (Pareto) optimum. This provides a basic reason 
for separating the activities of the economist and the politician, e.g. for separating 
economic science from the art political economy. The first is the concern of the 
economist theorist, the second of the politician. 
         In  practice,  the  relationship  existing  between  the  various  spheres  of  human 
action is not clear at all. For example, the economic life (the behaviour of individuals 
on the market place) takes place within a social, legal and political framework. It is 
acknowledged that there is an interdependence between the market and the 
framework: social, legal and political institutions result in shifts in the demand and 
supply curves of some or all markets; for example, trade unions are supposed to cause 
shifts of the supply curve of labour to the left, thus diminishing the supply of labour 
and thereby raising wage rates. A clear separation between the economic and other 
spheres does not seem possible; this might partly explain why "political economy is 
synonymous with economics [which consists in the] search for systematic regularities 
in economic behaviour [...] and originated in response to the information needs of 
central governments and policy-makers. Today, [...] the primary object of the exercise 
remains the same as it was in the seventeenth century: to provide national 
administrators and their responsible agents with the objective knowledge needed to 
design and implement efficient economic policies" (Deane 1989, p. v).  
         In  the  exchange  based  neoclassical framework, a tension between economic 
science and political economy arises because, on the one hand, there are separate 
causal forces that govern the various, supposedly autonomous spheres in which 
individuals become active: economic life is governed by the law of supply and demand, 
the political sphere is dominated by voting procedures and by party politics; on the 
other hand, there is clearly an interaction between the spheres: the broad 
organization of society influences the economic sphere (the market place): different 
social and political configurations determine the nature of market equilibria in that 
the social and political framework is part of the various parameters that govern a 
general economic equilibrium. This issue may be illustrated by the 'free trade versus 
protection' issue on the practical (political economy) side of which Marshall was so 
reluctant to take position in spite of his strong theoretical (economic science) 
convictions for free trade (Deane 1991, pp. 175-177). The theorist had to say that, in 
the very long run, free trade on the world scale would result in a general equilibrium 
associated with maximum world welfare. The political economist (the politician), 
however, would point to the immense structural changes required, in each country, to 
reach the new equilibrium; for example, those industries having an unfavourable 
relative cost position on the world markets would have to shrink or even to disappear, 
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process could involve growing import dependence with respect to basic goods needed 
in the process of production or with respect to necessary consumption goods. Given an 
uncertain world, even the most doctrinaire free-trader could understand the politician 
who opposed unrestricted free trade to prevent social upheavels in his country and to 
maintain some degree of autarchy with respect to basic goods to secure some degree of 
autonomy and independence (on these and similar lines Keynes [1982], is highly 
revealing). But the pure economic scientist (Marshall) would leave the decisions as to 
the implementation of protectionist policies to the political economist: he has to know 
how the political and social sphere works. The (neoclassical) economic scientist can, at 
best, come in to point to the dangers of excessive protection for the economic sphere: 
to maintain relatively unproductive sectors of production and reduced competitive 
pressure will lead to less favourable welfare outcomes. 
 
V. THE UNDERLYING VISION OF SOCIETY AND MAN, AND THE ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
"[A]nalytic effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies 
the raw material for the analytic effort [...] this preanalytic cognitive act will be called 
Vision" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 41). In the social sciences the vision is about the broad 
functioning of society and the relationships between society and individuals. 
Evidently, there are crucial differences between the vision of society and man in 
classical-Keynesian political economy and of neoclassical economics (Bortis 1997, pp. 
20-57 and 253-281). In the classical-Keynesian system, economy and society as a 
whole (the socioeconomic system) are primary and the behaviour of individuals is, in 
part, determined by the system; moreover, the socioeconomic system possesses laws of 
its own, and the rationality of the system may contradict the rationality of 
individuals, Keynes's paradox of saving being a case in point. In neoclassical 
economics, however, the optimising behaviour is primary; there is freedom of choice, 
within constraints though, which may be economic (scarcity), legal, political and 
social. These constraints constitute the framework within which economic actions 
take place. The differing visions of society and of man are crucial for the way in which 
the relationship between economic science and political economy is perceived. 
         If, as is the case in classical-Keynesian political economy, society is not simply 
seen as a collection of individuals but is something more than its parts, then, almost 
automatically, some kind of holism enters the analysis. The various spheres of 
socioeconomic and political life are considered to be complementary to some degree, 
thus forming an entity; individuals exercise different functions which mutually 
require each other. This implies that, spontaneously or consciously, social aims are 
pursued alongside individual aims. For example, a social aim - the production of the 
social product - is pursued within the social and circular process of production as 
pictured by Quesnay, Sraffa, Leontief and Pasinetti. Each (basic) sector plays a 
crucial role in the production process in that it is strictly complementary to the others 
which means that if there is no production in one basic sector, the social process of 
production would break down altogether. The production of a good by a firm is also a 
social process: a common aim is being pursued which implies complementarity and 
cooperation. 
          Determinism is exercised in various ways by the system. A certain capital stock 
- the result of past accumulation - implies a certain technique of production; the 
capital stock and its structure are given and cannot be changed readily. This implies 
that certain deliveries between industries and sectors must go on if the social process 
of production is to function in an orderly way. Or, the prices of prodution are 
determined  by the conditions of production and by the institutions regulating 
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demand determines  normal output and employment whereby directly and indirectly 
the whole of the socioeconomic and political system enters the picture.  
         However, the system does not determine everything. For instance, the volume of 
trend employment is determined by the socioeconomic system through the 
supermultiplier mechanism; however, the question who will be employed or 
unemployed remains open; in the attempt to get a job, professional ability and the 
way in which an individual acts on the 'labour market' is of crucial importance. Or, 
with the volume of trend investment determined by trend effective demand, the fate 
of the individual investment is highly uncertain and the professional ability of the 
individual investor will be very important in determining the success of the project. 
Moreover, the realized investment volume which depends on freely taken 
entrepreneurial decisions will always deviate from the system-determined 'trend' 
investment; the same is true of market prices and prices of production: the former 
result from (freely taken) individual decisions, the latter are determined by the 
system.  
          Classical-Keynesian long-period theory (Bortis 1997, pp. 142-204) is uniquely 
concerned with the functioning of the system similar to Quesnay and Ricardo, whilst 
the Keynesians and the post Keynesians mainly consider behavioural outcomes that 
are co-ordinated by the principle of effective demand: for example, in a Kaleckian 
vein, the volume of investment actually undertaken depends upon long-term 
expectations; investment will govern profit volumes and emplyoment levels through 
the principle of effective demand; realized profits will, in turn, exercise an influence 
upon investment (Bortis 1997, pp. 204-220). 
         The  social  and  circular  process  of  production  is  intimately  linked  with  the 
surplus principle: the determination, the appropriation and the use of the social 
surplus coming out of the production process are all very complex social and political 
processes. The surplus accrues partly to the state in the form of taxes and partly to 
particulars as after-tax profits, rents and surplus wages exceeding the necessary wage 
level. If a normative point of view is taken, this means that society ought to stand in 
the service of the individuals composing it: the surplus emerging from the process of 
production enables a society to erect a social, political and cultural superstructure 
within which individuals ought to be able to unfold their potential capabilities. In this 
context, Keynes and many of his followers have emphasized time and again that full 
employment and a socially acceptable distribution of income are essential 
prerequisites to the prospering of individuals. For example, in his "concluding notes 
on the social philosophy towards which the General Theory might lead [Keynes 
remarks that the] outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its 
failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of 
wealth and incomes" (Keynes 1973a, p. 372). 
         An  important  corollary  is  implied in classical-Keynesian political economy. 
Institutions in the broadest sense of the term (social and political institutions and 
regulated behaviour) and technology directly govern socioeconomic outcomes: the 
prices of production depend upon the technology in use and upon income distribution 
(the rate of profits or a hierarchy of profit rates); distribution itself is an immensely 
complex process: institutions associated with distribution (for example, trade unions, 
entrepreneurial associations, wage fixing on the basis of a historically evolved wage 
structure) result in certain profit rates which, in turn, imply a certain real wage and a 
certain wage structure. Finally, according to the supermultiplier relation pictured 
above, the 'independent variables' governing the level of trend employment are all 
directly governed by a complex set of institutions. The institutional determination of 
the fundamental socioeconomic magnitudes is the main tenet of Bortis (1997). 
         The fact that society as a whole enters into the determination of the prices and 
quantities is the reason why there is no tension at all between political economy and 
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Here, the economic, social, political and ethical spheres are complementary parts of 
the socioeconomic and political system which forms a structured entity. 
Correspondingly, the social and political sciences, of which political economy is a part, 
considers different properties, i.e. the economic, legal, social, political and ethical 
properties of the same object, i.e. society as a whole. This means that, if Phyllis 
Deane's definitions are adopted, economic science is that part of political economy 
which is concerned with explaining economic outcomes in terms of the social and 
political system. Political economy in a wider sense would also deal with, for instance, 
social and legal implications of economic outcomes and, of course, set up policy 
measures on the basis of the explanations given. In this sense the normative, for 
example full employment and a socially appropriate income distribution, is simply the 
ethically appropriate form of the positive which may be characterised by involuntary 
unemployment and an inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes. Thus, in the 
classical-Keynesian framework of analysis, the tension between economic science, i.e. 
pure theory dealing with principles, and political economy (applications of principles 
to unique real world situations) does not exist.  
         It  is  at  this  point  where  the crucial difference between classical-Keynesian 
political economy on the one hand and neoclassical or liberal economics on the other 
emerges (see also Bortis 1997, pp. 20-57 and 272-281). In the latter, the individual is 
primary and society is seen as a complex network between individuals which is based 
upon implicit and explicit contracts. Economic transactions, firms and, for some 
liberals, even the state are the result of contracts between individuals. Individuals act 
in various domains, most importantly in the economic and political sphere; individual 
actions are co-ordinated by self-regulating mechanisms, the market in the economic 
sphere and voting mechanisms in the political sphere. Society and social outcomes are 
thus explained in terms of individual actions exclusively: institutions, even if 
seemingly social like firms, have no specific social quality but are simply vehicles 
which enable individuals to reach individual aims more easily. Thus, the system does 
not possess laws of its own except the self-regulating mechanisms which co-ordinate 
the behaviour of individuals in the various spheres. In the economic sphere, the 
market is supposed to co-ordinate individual actions in a way such that individual 
rationality coincides with the rationality of the system. For example, increased 
savings are transformed into higher levels of investment through the proper 
functioning of the market for new capital goods. 
         The liberal or neoclassical vision of society inevitably leads to a tension between 
political economy and economic science: On the one hand, the economic sphere (the 
market place) is considered to be autonomous and self-contained; the object of pure 
economic science is precisely to set forth the principles governing the behaviour of 
individuals in their role as economic agents and the coordination of this behaviour by 
the market mechanism. On the other hand, there is an awareness of the mutual 
dependence of the economic sphere with the social and political framework that 
surrounds it. In general equilibrium terms the latter determines the parameters 
which govern the equilibrium values of prices and quantities. More popularly, the 
institutions pertaining to the framework partly govern the positions of the demand 
and supply curves on the various markets. For example, trade unions are said to shift 
the supply curve of labour to the left thus raising wages and reducing employment; or, 
legal prescriptions on environment protection raise costs of production in specific 
industries - the ensuing shift in supply curves raises prices and reduces quantities, 
that is the structure of the economy changes; the same is true if protective measures 
are introduced or abolished: the new institutions define a new equilibrium position of 
the economy, whereby the transition from the old to the new equilibrium may be 
extremely painful because some sectors will have to shrink and because it takes time 
for the sectors favoured by the changed institutional set-up to expand 
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         Thus, according to the neoclassical or liberal vision of society, institutions only 
indirectly influence economic events, i.e. through the market mechanism: institutional 
changes result in new equilibrium positions implying new structures. The choice of 
the institutional set-up of a society belongs to the domain of politics. The economic 
scientist has to accept the framework proposed by the politician and to confine his 
activities to the economic domain, i.e. to show how the behaviour of individuals is co-
ordinated by the market forces or to investigate the functioning of the price 
mechanism on goods and factor markets under various conditions. Marshall's instinct 
not to engage in discussions of political economy was, therefore, entirely sound from 
the liberal point of view. 
         The comparison of the classical-Keynesian and the neoclassical vision leaves us 
with a fundamental question: Do market forces produce a tendency towards a full 
employment equilibrium in a monetary production economy where "commodities are 
produced by means of commodities [and labour]" (Sraffa 1960), i.e. where production 
is a social and circular process? Two major reasons lead us to deny this. First, there is 
historical experience which shows that involuntary unemployment has been ever 
present, to a greater or lesser extent, in monetary production economies; the great 
crises of the last quarter of the 19th century and of the thirties of the 20th century are 
perhaps the prime historical examples for the inability of the market system to 
produce a tendency towards full employment. Second, the outcome of the capital 
theoretic debate has shown that there need not exist, even under ideal conditions, a 
tendency towards a full employment equilibrium, except by a fluke, as there are no 
regular associations between 'factor quantities' and 'factor prices'. This is associated 
with the fact that capital cannot be measured independently of distribution and prices 
if capital goods are heterogeneous (on this see Harcourt 1972).  
         Hence two reasons account for the tension between economic science, i.e. pure 
theory, and political economy, which comprises applications of pure theory in the case 
of neoclassical theory if the underlying vision is considered. The first concerns the 
institutional framework surrounding the market. This framework evidently 
influences the market equilibrium, and to bring into being an institutional framework 
compatible with full employment is virtually impossible due to a lack of knowledge 
about the immensely complex relationships existing between the market place and 
the institutional framework. What happens in practice is that institutions that might 
hamper the proper functioning of the market mechanism are eliminated or reduced in 
significance, i.e. trade unions, social and state expenditures, because high tax levels 
may make a country or a region less attractive to investors. 
         There is a second, more fundamental reason, for the tension between economic 
science (principles) and political economy (applications of principles) in neoclassical 
theory. If, even under ideal conditions, there is no persistent tendency towards a full 
employment equilibrium, the market is, in fact, unable to solve any of the great 
problems of economic theory, mainly value, distribution and employment, on a 
fundamental level. The central reason is that the basic neoclassical model - Walras's 
general equilibrium model - is based upon individuals and exchange. However, 
modern economies are monetary production economies, its constituting elements 
being money and finance and the social and circular process of production. Markets 
play a secondary role. In a classical vein, the role of market prices is to induce 
quantity adjustments tending to bring about the fundamental - normal - prices and 
quantities. 
          The  inability  of  the  neoclassical  model  to  solve,  in  principle,  the  great 
socioeconomic problems implies that liberal economic theory cannot come to grips 
with socioeconomic reality. Indeed, Walras showed that a general equilibrium may 
exist, giving thereby some content to Adam Smith's invisible hand. For him it went 
without saying that there was a strong, a natural tendency towards equilibrium. 
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of relevant historical events - the great crises - one may quite safely conclude that 
such a tendency does not exist, in principle (Bortis 1997, pp. 281-293). 
         The basic inability of neoclassical theory to come to grips with socioeconomic 
reality naturally results in tensions between economic science - pure theory or 
principles - and political economy - comprising applications, including policy 
applications - of economic science. Paradoxes may result, the most famous perhaps 
being Keynes's paradox of thrift; or, instead of a tendency towards equilibrium, 
increased competition may result in growing involuntary unemployment and 
increasing disparities in incomes and wealth. 
         To consider the relationship between political economy and economic science on 
the basis of the vision and of the material content underlying classical-Keynesian 
political economy on the one hand and neoclassical economic theory on the other is to 
take a global point of view. Two fundamental methodological issues are also closely 
linked with the relationship between economic science and political economy: the 
relationships between theory on the one hand and history as well as ethics and 
politics on the other. These are sketched in the two subsequent sections. 
 
VI. THEORY AND HISTORY IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
 
In the opening chapter of Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften, 
Carl Menger distinguishes two kinds of social science: the historical sciences aim at 
obtaining knowledge about unique  historical events; the theoretical sciences deal 
with the general elements embodied in recurring phenonoma (Menger 1883, pp. 3ff). 
For example, a history of prices would aim at explaining price formation in specific 
industries and markets at specified time periods. Theory would deal with the essence 
(the nature) of values and prices: are the latter ultimately governed by utility or by 
labour embodied? This implies looking for principles, e.g. the basic causal forces 
permanently at work in determining a certain phenomenon. Explanation of historical 
events is based upon the principles which are supposed to govern the events in 
question. Principles (pictured by theories) remain invariant, whilst the form in which 
they are applied to determine specific real world events changes. 
         After the Methodenstreit a rather sharp division between pure theorizing and 
historical investigations occurred. The German Historical School, the American 
Institutionalists and their followers rejected theory - classical and neoclassical - as 
being too abstract and entirely irrelevant, and concentrated on empirical and 
historical investigations. Since the publication of Keynes's General Theory the gap 
between theory and history seems to have narrowed somewhat. In this work, Keynes 
explicitly alludes to the economists of the German Historical School who were 
"sceptical, realistic, content with historical and empirical methods and results, which 
discard formal analysis. [...] Thus Germany, quite contrary to her habit in most of the 
sciences, has been content for a whole century to do without a formal theory of 
economics which was predominant and generally accepted.  
        Perhaps,  therefore,  I  may  expect less resistance from German, than from 
English, readers in offering a theory of employment and output as a whole, which 
departs in important respects from the orthodox tradition. [...] Can I persuade 
German economists that methods of formal analysis have something important to 
contribute to the interpretation of contemporary events and to the moulding of 
contemporary policy?" (Keynes 1973a, p. xxvi).  
         In his attempt to narrow the gap between theory and history, Keynes proceeds 
in a way similar to Menger's. Theory deals with the principles, picturing permanently 
acting causal forces in a pure form; in concrete historical situations principles take 
shape in widely varying forms which are the object of applied theory which, in turn, 
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P.G. Michaelides, National Technical University of Athens © 2010                                  Kindly hosted on-line: http://users.ntua.gr/jea  
65   
"the logical theory of the multiplier [the multiplier principle, H.B.], which holds good 
continuously, without time-lag, at all moments of time, and the consequences of an 
expansion in the capital-goods industries which take gradual effect, subject to time-
lag and only after an interval" (Keynes 1973a, p. 122). While the multiplier principle 
(a piece of pure theory) is of striking simplicity, its application to a concrete situation 
is extremely complex: "[This] can be seen most clearly by taking the extreme case 
where the expansion of employment in the capital-goods industries is so entirely 
unforeseen that in the first instance there is no increase whatever in the output of 
consumption-goods. In this event the efforts of those newly employed in the capital-
goods industries to consume a proportion of their increased incomes will raise the 
prices of consumption-goods until a temporary equilibrium between demand and 
supply has been brought about partly by the high prices causing a postponement of 
consumption, partly by a redistribution of income in favour of the saving classes as an 
effect of the increased profits resulting form the higher prices, and partly by the 
higher prices causing a depletion of stocks.  
         So far as the balance is restored by a postponement of consumption there is a 
temporary reduction of the marginal propensity to consume, i.e. the multiplier itself, 
and in so far as there is a depletion of stocks, aggregate investment increases for the 
time being by less than the increment of investment in the capital-goods industries 
[...]. As time goes on, however, the consumption-goods industries adjust themselves to 
the new demand, so that when the deferred consumption is enjoyed, the marginal 
propensity to consume rises temporarily above its normal level, to compensate for the 
extent to which it previously fell below it, and eventually returns to its normal level; 
whilst the restoration of stocks to their previous figure causes the increment of 
aggregate investment to be temporarily greater than the increment of investment in 
the capital-goods industries [...]" (Keynes 1973a, pp. 123-24). Keynes's method of 
reconciling theory and history emerges most clearly from his Treatise on Money 
(Keynes 1971). The first volume of this work exhibits principles or invariable causal 
forces and, consequently, is denoted The Pure Theory of Money; the second volume is 
about historical realisations of principles and is called The Applied Theory of Money.  
         Efforts made to narrow the gap between theory and history have also been made 
on the neoclassical side. Neoclassical economic theory based upon rationally behaving 
individuals has been applied to explaining historical developments in various fields 
(the new economic history) and the behaviour of collective agents (new institutional 
economics and new political economy). These micro and sectorial behavioural models 
have, to be sure, produced extremely valuable results. (Given this, it must be borne in 
mind that alternative explanations of behaviour, based upon post Keynesian or 
classical-Keynesian theories of the firm or upon managerial economics are also 
possible.) However, if macro-phenomena, i.e. the evolution of the volumes of 
employment and output in the course of the cycle, are considered, a tension between 
economic science and political economy continues to exist within the confines of 
neoclassical economics: it is very difficult to develop a real cycle theory on the basis of 
equilibrium economics as is evident from the 'rational expectations' cycle theory; 
therefore, cyclical movements are, as a rule, explained by external shocks, for example 
monetary factors: mistakes of monetary policy and/or excessive creation of credit 
money. Or persistent involuntary unemployment produced by the socioeconomic and 
political system cannot be explained at all on the basis of neoclassical equilibrium 
theory. Again this tension vanishes in classical-Keynesian political economy:  the 
supermultiplier theory explaining long-period output and employment trends and 
Kalecki's theory of cyclical growth and referred to above provide illustrations (Bortis 
1997, pp. 142-220). This is due to the method employed by neoclassical and classical-
Keynesian theorists. In the next two subsections it is attempted to substantiate these 
propositions. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
P.G. Michaelides, National Technical University of Athens © 2010                                  Kindly hosted on-line: http://users.ntua.gr/jea  
66  
         In classical and and classical-Keynesian political economy the principles used to 
explain real world phenomena are of extreme simplicity. With Ricardo, labour 
embodied regulates - in pure or in modified form - relative prices, distribution is 
governed by the marginal principle (which determines rent) and the surplus principle 
which explains the division of the remaining product into wages and profits. Keynes's 
General Theory, though very complex due to the various applications of his monetary 
theory of production to the real world rests, basically, on two very simple principles: 
the multiplier and the determination of the rate of interest through monetary factors. 
Thus, Ricardo and Keynes are using very simple causal models which enable the 
explanation in principle of selected aspects of the real world; the point of view taken is 
that of the socio-economic system as a whole, behavioural issues play a secondary 
role. Schumpeter clearly perceived this methodological issue: "The similarity between 
the aims and methods of those two eminent men, Keynes and Ricardo, is indeed 
striking, though it will not impress those who look primarily for the advice a writer 
tenders. Of course, there is a world between Keynes and Ricardo in this respect, and 
Keynes's views on economic policy bear more resemblence to Malthus'. But I am 
speaking of Ricardo's and Keynes's methods of securing the clear-cut result. On this 
they were bothers in spirit" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 473n). Similarly, Pasinetti states: 
"Like Ricardo, [Keynes] is always looking for fundamentals [i.e. principles regulating 
certain spheres of the real world, H.B.]. He singles out for consideration the variables 
he believes to be the most important. All the others, giving rise to unimportant 
complications [...] are, for immediate purposes, frozen out by simple assumptions. The 
characteristic consequence of this methodological procedure is the emergence in 
Keynes, as in Ricardo, of a system of equations of the 'causal type' or [...] of the 
'decomposable type', as opposed to a completely interdependent system of 
simultaneous equations" (Pasinetti 1974, pp. 43-44). Marshall also had perceived the 
problem: "[Ricardo] does not state clearly, and in some cases he perhaps did not fully 
and clearly perceive, how, in the problem of normal value, the various elements 
govern one another mutually, and not successively  in a long chain of causation" 
(Marshall 1920, p. 816). 
         Simple causal models of the type suggested by Ricardo and Keynes allow the 
pure theorist to establish hypotheses on how an economic outcome is brought about in 
principle; for example, Sraffa-Pasinetti production models tell us that the prices of 
production and the corresponding quantities are governed by the conditions of 
production and by income distribution (the rate of profits); hence, if the process of 
production is seen as a social phenomenon, pricing is not a microeconomic but a 
macroeconomic problem since the whole -  complementary - production process enters 
the picture. Similarly, the supermultiplier relation states how socio-economic and 
political institutions determine, in principle, the levels of 'trend' or normal level of 
output and of employment. These very simple causal models tell us how various 
causal forces are combined and, taken together, determine a single socioeconomic 
outcome, i.e. a price of production or the level of trend employment.  
         While pure causal models exhibiting principles, e.g. logical multiplier models, 
are of extreme simplicity, applied models may be extremely complex. This is 
suggested by Keynes's logical and applied multiplier mentioned above (Keynes 1973a, 
pp. 122-125). The reason is that the causal forces pictured by the model act 
simultaneously with a great many other causal forces which may modify the way in 
which the causal forces considered act. The social and circular process of production or 
the determination of the trend employment level by various socioeconomic and 
political institutions foreshadow the complexity of socioeconomic reality; in fact, each 
institution plays a specific role within the whole socioeconomic and political system 
and that there are interactions between institutions: complexity becomes organic. 
Thus, for the applied economist, and even more for the policy maker, it is not 
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principles governing selected aspects of the real world. Knowledge about the 
functioning of a specific society is essential (whereby knowledge about complex objects 
is always probable in Keynes's sense (Bortis 1997, pp. 57-74). However, the crucial 
point here is that no tension exists in classical-Keynesian political economy between 
theory (the principles pictured by causal models) on the one hand, history (application 
of principles to explain some socioeconomic phenomenon) and policies (political 
economy) aimed at improving given situations in desired directions on the other hand 
(Bortis 1997, pp. 118-30). The reason is that the classical-Keynesian vision embraces 
the entire socio-economic and political system which forms an ordered entity with the 
economic, social, political and cultural sphere playing complementary roles. With 
institutions given - as the result of historical evolution - the functioning of the socio-
economic and political system as a whole is considered; the basic aim of the 
theoretical economist consists in looking for the principles that regulate selected 
aspects of the system. Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Keynes General 
Theory are the landmarks in the search for principles of this kind. 
         Neoclassical  economic  theory  tackles  the  relationship  between  theory  and 
history in an entirely different way. In fact, macroeconomic and social phenomena are 
explained in terms of the behaviour of individuals. This leads, as has been suggested 
above, to a tension between economic science (theory) and political economy (concrete 
policy actions). Moreover, a tension between theory and history also emerges.  
         Menger takes it for granted that it is possible and highly desirable to explain 
social phenomena - money, the state, division of labour, markets - on the basis of the 
behaviour of individuals (Menger 1883, pp. 153ff and 171ff). He calls this method 
'exact' and 'atomistic' and considers it to be truly 'scientific' (Menger 1883, p. 156). 
This methodological procedure has become a hallmark of neoclassical economic 
theory: the microfoundations are all important. If the behaviour of all agents in the 
economic sphere is considered, as is the case in the Walrasian general equilibrium 
model, an overall or macro view is not required, the implication being that the system 
is not regulated by laws of its own independent of the behaviour of individuals: "[...] 
the logical structure of Walras' system [sets forth] the conditions or relations 
(equations) that are to determine the equilibrium values of all the economic variables 
[...]: the prices of all products and factors and the quantities of these products and 
factors that would be bought, in perfect equilibrium and pure competition, by all the 
househould and firms. [...] since the determination of these quantities implies the 
determination of individual as well as group and social incomes, this theory also 
includes all that is covered by the concept of Income Analysis and that the conditions 
or relations to be considered, though they are fundamentally microanalytic in nature 
(they refer fundamentally to the quantities bought and sold by individual households 
and firms), also include macroanalytic aspects, for example, as regards total 
employment in the society  [our emphasis]. It cannot be too strongly impressed upon 
the reader that it is not correct to contrast income or macroanalysis of, say, the 
Keynesian type with the Walrasian microanalysis as if the latter were a theory that 
neglects, and stands in need of being supplemented by, income and macroanalysis" 
(Schumpeter 1954, pp. 998-999). The market system is supposed to co-ordinate the 
rational actions of individuals in such a way that the rationality of the system is 
qualitatively the same as individual rationality: general equilibrium outcomes are 
individually and socially optimal.  
         The attempts of the neoclassical economists to explain macro-outcomes on the 
basis of the behaviour of individuals inevitably leads to a tension between theory and 
history which is closely linked with the tension that exists between economic science 
and political economy. This tension is linked with the functioning of the market 
mechanism which co-ordinates individual actions in the economic sphere and with the 
relationship of this mechanism to other spheres. If, given sufficient competition, 
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equilibrium a tension between theory and history would not exist, which seems to be 
the case in the 'rational expectations approach' (equilibrium business cycles!). Nor 
would there be a tension if the equilibrium prices and quantities of the Walrasian 
equilibrium model constituted centres of gravitation as Walras (and the early 
neoclassicals) postulated: "Walras, much like J.B. Clark, conceived [...] equilibrium 
prices to be, normally, the level around which prices oscillate in real life [...]. Like 
Clark, he used the analogy with the 'level' of the lake in order to convey his idea - the 
old idea of A. Smith" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 999n). Historical reality, for instance 
prices and quantities, could, in this case, be interpreted as deviations from the long-
run equilibrium governed by the permanent or slowly changing forces (technology and 
institutions).  
         However,  a  tension  between  theory  and  historical  reality  arises  if  the 
fundamental equilibrium lies in the future and would be reached only if a present 
disequilibrium situation could work out without being disturbed any more. This 
implies postulating a stationary framework surrounding the market. As conditions 
are never stationary in the real world, the impact of new disturbances arising during 
the adjustment process on the equilibrium position and upon the process itself would 
have to be assessed3 (on the problems associated with centres of gravitation see 
Harcourt 1982, pp. 205-221, who distinguishes four different concepts of centre of 
gravitation). This would require a dynamic theory of immense complexity picturing 
the relationship between the various domains in which individuals act: economic, 
social and political in the main. A complete theory of this type has, however, never 
been produced by neoclassical economists; only partial and piecemeal theories built on 
the concepts of 'external effects' of the economic system on other subsystems or vice 
versa have been elaborated. Finally, the tension between theory and history (and 
between economic science and political economy) becomes extreme and leads to a 
rupture if there is no permanent tendency towards a fundamental equilibrium 
position at all. This is precisely the principal result of the capital theory debate 
(Harcourt 1972). As suggested above, the outcome of this debate - which started with 
Ricardo who was the first to clearly state that relative prices depend, as a rule, upon 
the conditions of production and on income distribution - very seriously hampers the 
scientific status of neoclassical equilibrium economics; for example, no regular 
associations between factor prices and factor quantities exist, which implies that 
supply and demand forces are unable to produce a persistent tendency towards full 
employment. This implies a cleavage between theory and history (and between 
economic science and political economy) since possible equilibria are not rooted in 
historical reality and therefore become hypothetical. Exchange based equilibrium 
theory based upon optimizing behaviour of individuals is simply not in a position to 
explain macrophenoma - business cycles and persistent involuntary unemployment - 
which result from the functioning of the socioeconomic system. This is the reason why, 
in the early 1930s, Keynes set out to develop a monetary theory of production (Keynes 
1973b, pp. 408-411). 
         To  be  sure,  the  scientific  analysis  of  behaviour  in  the  economic  sphere  is 
indispensable when tackling microeconomic and sectorial issues. However, the 
analysis of macroeconomic problems, like the determination of trend output and 
employment levels and cyclical movements of an economy requires a macro approach 
in order to come to grips approximately with the functioning of socioeconomic 
systems, because these systems possess laws of their own, for example the laws 
associated with the social process of production and with the principle of effective 
demand. Keynes certainly felt that the principle of effective demand represented an 
important tool for analysing historical movements of the volumes of output and 
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employment (Keynes 1973a, foreword to the German edition). Simultaneously, he 
vigorously rejected methodological individualism and equilibrium theory built 
hereupon: "The celebrated optimism of traditional [equilibrium] theory, which has led 
to economists being looked upon as Candides, who, having left this world for the 
cultivation of their gardens, teach that all is for the best in the best of all possible 
worlds provided we will let well alone, is also to be traced [...] to their having 
neglected to take account of the drag on prosperity which can be exercised by an 
insufficiency of effective demand. For there would obviously be a natural tendency 
towards the optimum employment of resources in a society which was functioning 
after the manner of the [neo]classical postulates. It may well be that the [neo]classical 
theory represents the way in which we should like our economy to behave. But to 
assume that it actually does so is to assume our difficulties away" (Keynes 1973a, pp. 
33-34). There is a complete separation of theory and history in neoclassical economics: 
neoclassical equilibrium theory does not contribute to explaining real world 
phenomena like involuntary unemployment, which are, in fact, interpreted as 
deviations from a postulated equilibrium situation. 
 
VII. ETHICS AND POLITICS, AND THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The tension between economic science and political economy existing in neoclassical 
economic theory also shows up in the domains of ethics and politics, while the 
relationship between these domains in classical-Keynesian political economy is, in 
principle, harmonious. The issues involved here can perhaps be dealt with most 
appropriately by having a look at the implications of the neoclassical and classical-
Keynesian vision of man and of society briefly dealt with in section V above. 
         To begin with, it is appropriate to distinguish between two types of institutions 
(which may be defined as frameworks within which individual and social aims are 
permanently pursued). A first type of institutions is individualistic and is, as such, 
associated with regulated behaviour: individual aims (for example, to pursue certain 
consumption patterns) are persistently pursued. Second, there are social institutions 
which can be seen in two ways. In the usual sense as is implied in classical-Keynesian 
political economy, social institutions are linked with the pursuit of common  aims; this 
involves, on the one hand, division of labour and of tasks and, on the other, 
coordination of the various functions exercised, with co-operation  playing a crucial 
role if a social institution is to function properly. For example, the process of 
production is a social (macro-)institution within which a common aim is 
(spontaneously) pursued, i.e. the production of the social product, each sector and 
each industry exercising a certain function in this process. In this sense, a social 
institution is something more than the sum of its parts which, in a way, forms a 
structured entity. Social instiutions and society as a whole thus possess their own 
laws that cannot be reduced to the behaviour of individuals pursuing individual aims. 
The latter goes along with a rather narrow a view of man, while social activities 
within social institutions enrich each participant. Of course, there are considerable 
areas of freedom with social institutions: the social aim associated with a specific 
institution may be reached in different ways, individuals may choose the social 
institutions within which they want to be active and, finally, it is possible to create 
new institutions.  
         A liberal economist would presumably attach another meaning to the notion of 
'social institution'. He would consider it as a vehicle enabling the associated 
individuals to reach individual aims in a better way. For example, the state provides a 
legal framework enabling individuals to pursue individual aims in various domains, 
e.g. utility and profit maximization under constraints; or, the firm facilitates 
production. Social institutions (including the state) are, in the liberal view, based on 
explicit or implicit contracts between individuals. Society, i.e. the sum of social THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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institutions, is thus secondary in the sense that it is derived from the behaviour of 
individuals. 
         According  to  the  liberal  vision,  with  the  autonomous  individual  occupying  a 
primary position and society being secondary, ethics, politics and the economy are 
simply domains within which individuals become active: there is the economic, the 
political and the ethical man. Each sphere is, in principle, autonomous and regulated 
by specific mechanisms. Within each sphere individual aims are pursued, e.g. utility 
and profit maximization in the economic sphere and the pursuit and maintainance of 
political power in the political sphere. Under competitive conditions this kind of 
behaviour is supposed to produce a tendency towards a socioeconomic optimum in the 
economic sphere. This is why Walras called his main work Eléments d'économie 
politique pure ou théorie de la richesse sociale. In principle, ethics is not needed in the 
economic sphere because economic values are automatically realized through the 
market mechanism. Relative to the initial endowments the equilibrium (market) price 
is the 'just price', the laws of functional income distribution based upon the marginal 
productivity theory are considered to be natural. Ethics might enter the scene 
precisely in relation with the 'socially appropriate' distribution of endowments. 
         However,  in  the  presence  of  disequilibria  the  aims  pursued  in  the  various 
spheres may give rise to conflicts. For instance, it has been suggested above, that the 
question of protection of certain or all industries may create a tension between the 
political and social sphere on the one hand and the economic sphere on the other: 
protection will prevent or slow down structural adjustment and thereby reduce 
structural unemployment in the short or medium term; in the long run however 
protection will, in the liberal view, give rise to welfare costs. Or, more equity might be 
ethically desirable, but would reduce efficiency in the economic sphere. The 
neoclassical economist cannot take position on these issues. All he can do is tell the 
politician how the trade off between equity and efficiency looks like and leave it to her 
to decide. Economic science is considered to be neutral and value free.  
         Thus, the tension between economics, ethics and politics arises, on the one hand, 
because of conflicting views on the aims to be pursued in the various spheres (how far 
should protection go?). Moreover, the various spheres mutually influence each other: 
social, political and cultural institutions affect the economic domain in that they 
shape the general equilibrium of prices and quantities, that is institutions influence 
the positions of supply and demand curves. This implies that a specific institutional 
set up would be required to guarantuee the existence of a full employment 
equilibrium. However, any attempt to create an 'institutional equilibrium system' is 
bound to fail almost certainly, simply because the task is too complex. (Some system 
theoretists seem to argue that the competitive mechanism can be applied to all 
spheres of human activity to produce a tendency towards a comprehensive social 
equilibrium. In view of problems associated with tendencies towards Walrasian 
equilibria it is difficult to see how an overall social equilibrium could come into being.) 
Tensions between the economic sphere and other domains of human activity are thus 
inevitable because of contradictions existing between the various spheres (equity 
versus efficiency is an example) and because of the lack of a comprehensive theory to 
co-ordinate the different domains of human activity. Finally, tensions between 
economics and ethics arise because economies are never in equilibrium and changes in 
all spheres occur continuously; for example, there is a reluctance to extend payments 
to involuntarily unemployed because this might affect the proper functioning of the 
labour market. 
         If a classical-Keynesian vision of society and man is taken, an entirely different 
relationship between the economic sphere on the one hand and politics and ethics on 
the other emerges (Bortis 1997, pp. 39-47). Here, society and man are seen as entities: 
societies are not merely collections of individuals and man is something more than a 
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economy belong to the moral sciences because each human action, whether individual 
or social, economic or political, has an ethical dimension. This always went without 
saying for the historically and institutionally minded social scientists. Keynes also 
wanted "to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science" 
(Keynes, Collected Works, vol. XIV, p. 300). "The central question [is]: 'What is the 
right way for men to live, both as individuals and as a group?' On this basis we can 
distinguish two main branches of practical philosophy - [individual] ethics (or moral 
philosophy) and politics [political philosophy or social ethics]" (Brown 1986, p. 11). 
Brown subsequently presents a neo-Aristotelian system of ethics which could provide 
the ethical foundations for classical-Keynesian political economy (Brown 1986, 
chapter six, pp. 130 ff.).  
         Social ethics deals with the ethical content, i.e. the contribution to the common 
weal or the public interest, of the social activities of man which show up in the pursuit 
of common aims where individual actions acquire a social dimension in that they are 
complementary and in that co-operation is essential. For example, the process of 
production, be it on the macro, the sector or the firm level, is essentially a social 
process.  
         Moreover,  what  appears  to  be  an individual action rests on a large social 
background. For example, consumption is certainly individual, but the consumption 
pattern may be very much socially determined. Hence social institutions play an 
essential ethical role, not only in the socio-economic, but also in the political and 
cultural sphere, because of their greater or less contribution to the public interest. 
                  If society is seen as an entity, then the various spheres (economic, social, 
political) are to some extent complementary and there must exist a specific 
relationship between them. The social role of the economic system is the production of 
a social surplus which enables a society to erect, on the economic (material) basis, an 
institutional superstructure: a political system, a legal framework, and cultural 
institutions in the widest sense of the word. The way in which society is organized 
depends upon a system of values, the supreme value being the public interest. In 
some societies cultural values in the widest sense dominate, in others material values 
are put to the fore. Changing value systems, sometimes initiated by an evolution in 
the forces of production, set into motion institutional change. For example, cultural 
activities may be enhanced by diminishing economic activities through a reduction of 
working time which, in turn, is rendered possible through technical progress.  
         Ideally, the role of politics consists in arranging as harmoniously as is humanly 
possible the various spheres of society in order to approach the common weal to a 
feasible extent. This is an extremely complicated task as, on account of the social 
value system, everything depends on everything. The task of politics is also 
permanent as changes in circumstances, material or other, constantly occur and, 
consequently, the threat of disharmony and of growing alienation is permanent. 
         Political or social ethics thus deals with the good or right organization of society. 
The fundamental notion is that of distributive justice which is about the relationship 
of parts to the social whole. The meaning of this notion can perhaps be illustrated best 
by applying it to the fundamental issue in political economy, i.e. income distribution. 
Distributive justice comes in here in two ways, i.e. the determination of the surplus 
(profits and rents) and of the structure of wages. The possibility to realize profits is 
essential for enhancing the productive powers of an economy, i.e. to produce at the 
lowest possible costs. Rents are not only important regarding land but also relative to 
labour: outstanding skills must be materially rewarded. With the surplus and 
consequently the wages share determined, the problem of fixing the wage structure 
occurs. Each wage structure implies a valuation of the different kinds of labour. This 
means determining the socioeconomic position - the status - of each type of labour.  
         Clearly, in this view, distribution is not a market problem implying relations 
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deals with the relationship between individuals and groups on the one hand and 
society on the other, i.e. a part-whole relationship. It is here that conflicts may arise 
between individuals or groups. To eliminate these conflicts as far as is possible and to 
bring about a socially acceptable wage structure and socially acceptable shares of 
profit and rents is the principal task of political economy and, as such, one of the main 
tasks of politics. Obviously, the task is immensely complex which is compounded by 
the fact that income distribution directly influences other parts of social life; for 
example, overall labour productivity and the levels of employment and output. It is 
likely that a broadly equitable distribution of incomes has a favourable influence upon 
labour productivity because of improved labour relations and upon the levels of 
employment and output because of a higher level of effective demand. Higher levels of 
labour productivity and of employment result in an increase of the surplus which in 
turn renders possible an extension of cultural activities, for example.  
         The  prime  task  of  politics  is  to promote the public interest (the traditional 
common weal). This implies creating favourable socioeconomic, political and legal 
preconditions enabling individuals to prosper, i.e. to approximately realize those 
fundamental values which constitute a good life (Brown 1986, ch. 6). In a monetary 
production economy with extensive division of labour full employment and an 
equitable distribution of incomes are certainly the most important of these 
preconditions. These domains of social and economic life lie within the confines of 
political economy which ought to aim at organizing economic life in a way most 
beneficial to society as a whole. James Steuart put this admirably: "What economy is 
in a family, political economy is in a state: [...]. The great art [...] of political economy 
is, first to adapt the different operations of it to the spirit, manners, habits, and 
customs of people; and afterwards to model these circumstances so, as to be able to 
introduce a set of new and more useful institutions. 
         The principal object of this science is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for 
all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious; to 
provide every thing necessary for supplying the wants of the society, and to employ 
the inhabitants [...] in such a manner as naturally to create reciprocal relations and 
dependencies between them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply 
one another with their reciprocal wants" (Steuart 1966, pp. 16-17). In a more modern 
vein one could say that a monetary production economy is a means to provide the 
material foundations for a society organized on the basis of certain values. From this 
vision of things, based upon the classical surplus principle, the normative character of 
political economy clearly emerges. 
         Individuals  act  within  the  confines  of  a  social  organization,  i.e.  the  material 
basis and the institutional superstructure. Again their actions always comprise an 
ethical dimension. The ethical problem is not to follow formal rules, e.g. to maximize 
utility, but to aim at specific concrete values which are hierarchically ordered, e.g. 
"physical and mental health, material affluence (within limits), the development of 
(some of) one's potential, useful or 'meaningful' work, a set of personal relationships 
(friendship, love etc.) and to regulate these [in order to obtain] a rational plan of life to 
be lived in a rationally organized society" (Brown 1986, p. 136). The precise content of 
these values will differ between individuals because each human being is unique. 
Ethics thus deals with the good conduct of individuals; this includes relations between 
individuals. The ethical meaning of the latter may be illustrated by a famous 
economic example, i.e. the problem of the just price at which goods ought to be sold. If 
the process of production is seen as a social and circular process the prices of 
production depend on the technical condition of production and upon income 
distribution, that is the structure of money wages and the rate of profits; the structure 
of money wages reflects, in turn, a valuation of the various types of labour.  
         These  distributional  preconditions for pricing reflect the Ricardian tenet that 
distribution logically precedes value. Now, a socially appropriate wages structure and THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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socially appropriate shares in national income reflects distributive justice which, in 
turn, expresses part-whole relationships, i.e. relations between individuals and 
groups on the one hand and society on the other. Hence the prices of production reflect 
social ethical arrangements in the realm of distribution and the efforts undertaken by 
society to produce goods which shows up in the conditions of production. If now the 
distributional arrangements are socially appropriate and, therefore, approximate 
distributive justice, the prices of production would reflect just prices. And trade at just 
prices or selling goods at just prices would, in turn, imply commutative justice in the 
sense of Aristotle and Aquinas: trade or sale is balanced and fair and expresses 
ethically appropriate relationships between the exchanging individuals or between 
producers and consumers. Hence approximate commutative justice only obtains if a 
social precondition is fulfilled, i.e. if distributive justice is - approximately - achieved. 
This suggests that an ethically appropriate organization of society is a precondition 
for ethically correct behaviour on the individual level. 
         The  remarks  made  so  far  in  this section clearly indicate that, in classical-
Keynesian political economy, ethics is intimately linked with all economic 
phenomena. This is also true if, as will always be the case, a greater or smaller gap 
exists between some real world situation and the ethically perfect situation in which 
the common weal would be realized (Bortis 1997, pp. 47-53). To modify somewhat a 
Marxian notion this gap might be called alienation to designate the tension between 
'what exists' and 'what ought to exist'. Keynes, but also Marx perceived that 
alienation is caused by an inappropriate functioning of the socioeconomic system.  
Marx argued that private property led to a misconceived organization of the 
socioeconomic system and thus to alienation; Keynes however realized that persistent 
involuntary unemployment, due to defects of the market system, was the main source 
of system-caused alienation. Without discussing this particular point we think that 
Keynes is basically right. The main reason is that private property is an important 
social institution which contributes to the good functioning of society because 
individuals care about what they own and social peace is enhanced if property is 
widely spread (Bortis 1997, pp. 158-175). 
         Alienation brought about by persistent involuntary unemployment may lead to a 
perversion of certain or all ethical values. For example, in an unemployment situation 
the production and the export of weapons might be justified by the fact that work 
places are saved; or, according to Maynard Keynes and William Petty, useless work, 
like building pyramids is to be preferred to leaving workers involuntarily unemployed. 
However, the prime example for this way of reasoning is Bernard de Mandeville, who 
argued that private vices were public virtues if they contributed to secure work places.  
         Because  of  its  destructive  effects on individual and social life, involuntary 
unemployment is certainly the central socioeconomic problem arising in a monetary 
production economy; the gradual formation of a two-class society is perhaps the major 
social effect of persistent unemployment. To develop a fundamental - long-period - 
theory of output and employment is, therefore, a central problem of political economy 
(Bortis 1997, pp. 142-204). On the basis of long-period employment theory one may, in 
turn, suggest conceptions for policy actions in line with the requirements of social or 
political ethics (Bortis 1997, ch. 6). 
 
VIII. ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND THE ART OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
In section V above it has been suggested that an entirely different vision of society 
and of man is implied in the neoclassical approach and in the classical-Keynesian 
approach (Bortis 1997, pp. 253-56). This is associated with widely differing views on 
the great problems of economic theory: value, distribution, employment and money 
(sections III and IV). The method employed in both approaches is also fundamentally 
different; this shows up in a differing relationship between theory and historical THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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reality (section VI). Finally, the relationship between economics on the one hand and 
ethics and politics on the other is sharply opposed to the liberal and the middle-way 
classical-Keynesian view (section VII).  
         It has been suggested that in neoclassical economics a tension exists between 
economic science and political economy, between theory and history and between 
economics on the one hand and ethics and politics and that such a tension does not 
exist in classical-Keynesian political economy. The clue to this state of affairs is 
provided by the differing visions of society and of man associated with both 
approaches and the implications of these visions.  
         In the neoclassical approach the autonomous individual is primary. Man is seen 
as a technocrat acting rationally in various spheres of life, economic, political, ethical. 
Society is a collection of individuals who are linked through a network of implicit and 
explicit contracts. There is no comprehensive view of man and of society: man and 
society are not considered as entities. This individualistic approach is certainly very 
useful to explain the behaviour of individuals and collectives. However, if the various 
mechanisms that are supposed to co-ordinate behaviour do not work properly in a 
monetary production economy - if no tendency towards a full-employment equilibrium 
exists -, and if the relationships between the economic, social and political sphere are 
not specified, overall evolutions (output trends, unemployment levels, for example) 
cannot be explained in terms of individual actions. The system is governed by laws of 
its own. As a consequence, the rationality of the system may differ from the 
rationality of individuals. Paradoxes occur, the most important being perhaps 
Keynes's paradox of thrift, which implies that a more unequal income distribution 
may lead to higher unemployment levels which, in turn, may cause the distribution of 
incomes to become even more unequal - this is immediately evident from the 
supermultiplier relation (Bortis 1997, p. 146). It is these contradictions which lead to 
tensions in various fields if the viewpoint of neoclassical economic science is adopted 
to tackle socioeconomic phenomena. 
         The tensions between economic science and political economy seem to be mainly 
due to the closed and autonomous character of economic science which is a direct 
consequence of the neoclassical vision of man and of society. The object of enquiry of 
neoclassical economic theory is, consequently, the immediately visible - surface 
phenomena or appearances -, i.e. market prices and the corresponding quantities; 
underlying social processes - production and distribution - are ignored (production 
simply appears as an application of exchange as is illustrated by the concept of a 
factor market). Given the immense complexity of the real world with everything 
depending on everything else, the basic neoclassical model - the general equilibrium 
model - is also extremely complex, in spite of the facts that attention is confined to the 
economic sphere only and that the level of abstraction is very high as is the case with 
the Walrasian model. A first type of tension is due to the nature of this model which is 
simply not operable, a fact perceived with great clarity by Alfred Marshall. However, 
the partial equilibrium approach, when conceived to solve macro problems (income 
distribution, employment levels) involves further tension. The relationship of one 
market with all the other markets and, more fundamentally, of the market system 
with other subsystems (the political, social, ethical subsystems) are not specified in a 
general form. The latter would require a general theory of external effects (produced 
by the economic system) and of impacts from outside (the framework surrounding an 
economy) in terms of the behaviour of individuals. Such a theory is, probably, 
intractable, even on a purely formal level. Given this, the tensions between economic 
science and political economy, between theory and history, and between the economic 
and the political and ethical sphere will, presumably, ever grow as (neoclassical) 
economic science 'progresses'. 
         We have suggested that such tensions do, in principle, not exist in the classical-
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whole. The scientific procedure is not based upon a subjective basis (methodological 
individualism) and dominated by formal rules to be followed by individuals: profit and 
utility maximisation under constraints in the economic sphere. The questions are 
about specific concrete objects. For example, Ricardo inquired into the principles that 
regulate distribution and relative prices. He realized that both were interrelated and 
dependent upon the entire socioeconomic system. Methodologically speaking, Ricardo 
asked for fundamentals: what is the nature (the essence) of the price? This implies 
abstracting from transient surface phenomena, e.g. market prices, and concentrating 
on what is stable or slowly changing. Each price is now seen to depend upon the 
conditions of production and upon distribution (the rate of wages), with the latter 
depending on a complex set of institutions. From Pasinetti (1977 and 1981) emerges 
with great clarity that each price of production is in fact a macroeconomic 
phenomenon, which is determined by the whole social production system. Similarly, 
Keynes, in his General Theory dealt with one precise problem, involuntary 
unemployment. The principle of effective demand can operate in a monetary 
production economy only and involves that the whole socioeconomic and political 
system comes in to determine the level of employment. This is particularly evident if 
the supermultiplier relation mentioned in section III above is considered (Bortis 1997, 
pp. 142-154). Classical-Keynesian political economy thus start from society (made up 
of a set of interrelated institutions composing the material basis and the political, 
legal, social and cultural superstructure) as should be the case in the social sciences. 
The problem is to discover the principles that regulate selected phenomena, prices 
and employment levels; Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, for 
example, illustrates this methodological procedure. As society as a whole is considered 
when tackling an economic problem, a tension between economic science (a set of 
principles) and political economy cannot exist. This does not imply that the concrete 
application of the principles to the real world, when pursuing specific economic 
policies, is easy and straightforward; the difficulties have been alluded to in section 
III above where Keynes's 'logical theory of the multiplier' and a real world application 
of this principle have been considered. This implies that any application of principles 
to a specific historical situation for explanatory or for policy purposes requires an 
intimate knowledge of the concrete circumstances in question; the application of 
principles cannot be mechanical as societies are of organic complexity (man and 
society are 'ethical organisms' because of the interrelatedness of values which form a 
hierarchical system). It is here that the art of historical reasoning and the art of 
political economy come in. Due to the ethical nature of societies, reasoning in history 
and in political economy cannot be based uniquely on scientific explanation but 
requires understanding based upon a comprehensive vision of man and society. 
         The fact that principles (theoretical tools) can be applied without difficulty to 
explain historical situations as Keynes envisaged it (Keynes 1973a, German edition) 
implies that there is no tension between theory and history in classical-Keynesian 
political economy either. Explanation of selected aspects of reality is attempted by the 
means of simple causal models. Finally, there is no tension between economic science 
and ethics. In fact, the social sciences are, as has been stressed by Keynes, moral 
sciences by their very nature. On the one hand, each human action embodies an 
ethical dimension in that, spontaneously or consciously, aims are pursued which may 
be good or bad in varying degrees. On the other hand, social and political ethics deals 
with the organization of society reflected in a certain institutional set-up. A society is 
organized better, the closer the basic aim of political ethics - the public interest or the 
common weal - is approached, i.e. the less alienation prevails. 
          It should be stressed that markets and individuals in the market place are not 
considered as unimportant in classical-Keynesian political economy. Particularly, the 
market is supposed to bring about a tendency of market prices towards the socially 
determined prices of production. The scope of the market is therefore much narrower THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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than in the liberal (neoclassical) case where markets, if functioning satisfactorily, are 
supposed to solve the most important economic problems. 
         The question concerning the relationship between economic science and political 
economy, posed by Phyllis Deane, is associated with basic issues in economic theory 
and policy and in the organization of society. Its importance deserves a thorough 
investigation by social scientists, especially after the downfall of the socialist systems 
and the doubts that continue to prevail on the ability of market economies to provide 
satisfactory solutions to income distribution and employment, which are, according to 
Keynes, the two great socioeconomic problems of our time (Keynes 1973a, p. 372). 
After the downfall of socialism, the tension between economic science and political 
economy within the liberal doctrine and the continuing contradictions of capitalism 
naturally leads to asking the fundamental question about the possibility of a 
humanist middle-way alternative. Bortis (1997) attempts to combine Keynes's 
principle of effective demand with the classical surplus principle and contributes to 
establishing a system of classical-Keynesian political economy. As has been suggested 
here, the tension between political economy and economic science vanishes in 
principle within this humanist middle-way system. A reconciliation of political 
economy and of economic science, however crude, on Keynesian and classical ground 
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